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There is one human nature. Just as there is no difference in kind
between prenatal, neonatal, adolescent, adult, and elderly human beings,
there is likewise no difference in kind between black, white, Asian, or
other ethnic groups of human beings. There is only one “race” of
people—the human race.
“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”1 “Our
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.”2 Government efforts to pigeonhole groups of people into racial
boxes—what Chief Justice Roberts called a “sordid business,”3—is both
*

Jay Alan Sekulow is Chief Counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice
(ACLJ), an organization dedicated to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by
law. Walter M. Weber is Senior Counsel at the ACLJ. The ACLJ filed amicus briefs in
the Fisher litigation in both the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. This article is
drawn heavily from the most recent ACLJ amicus brief in Fisher.
1
Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
2
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts,
J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
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ultimately incoherent (as people of mixed ethnicity illustrate) and the
hallmark of racism (as with the Nazi efforts to define Jews and the
segregationist efforts to define “colored” people). The use of racial
labeling by the University of Texas (UT) is therefore incompatible with
one of the basic premises of the Constitution: the inherent, equal dignity
of all persons.

I.

GOVERNMENT MAY NOT ATTACH SIGNIFICANCE
TO RACIAL LABELS.

When the government forbids the differential treatment of
individuals on the basis of racial labels, it properly sets itself against race
discrimination. But when the government undertakes to treat people
differentially on the basis of racial labels, it runs afoul of the norm of
color-blindness that should be the touchstone of government action in
light of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In particular, a government’s use of racial classifications as
qualifications for preferences or disabilities suffers from two glaring
flaws: first, such labeling is ultimately incoherent, as racial categories are
both arbitrary and porous; and second, such labeling, and the
concomitant need to decide who fits into which racial “box,” associates
the government with some of the worst historical pedigrees in human
history.

A.

Racial Categories Are Arbitrary and Ultimately Incoherent

The enforcement of any system of racial preference necessarily
requires a determination of who counts as belonging to which race.
“When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first
define what it means to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is
nonwhite?”4
In a world of completely segregated populations, it might be possible
to maintain the fiction that there are intrinsically distinct, identifiable
ethnic groups such as “black” and “white,” or “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” or
“Asian” and “Hispanic.” But in a cosmopolitan world, such pretensions
are exposed as utterly illusory. Countless children are born each day with
a heritage drawing upon a host of varied ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
Indeed, there are websites devoted to identifying and celebrating such

4

Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (addressing the
question whether a man of Japanese heritage is a “white person”).
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“multiracial” children.5 And the number of “multiracial” children is
growing.6 Hence, human beings cannot be pigeonholed into racial boxes,
and it is offensive to insist that the government can—or must, as for
purposes of state college admissions—do so. As the Supreme Court of
California stated:
If the [government rule assigning significance to racial
categories] is to be applied generally to persons of mixed
ancestry the question arises whether it is to be applied on
the basis of the physical appearance of the individual or
on the basis of a genealogical research as to his ancestry.
If the physical appearance of the individual is to be the
test, the [rule] would have to be applied on the basis of
subjective impressions of various persons. Persons
having the same parents and consequently the same
hereditary background could be classified differently. On
the other hand, if the application of the [rule] to persons
of mixed ancestry is to be based on genealogical
research, the question immediately arises what
proportions of [the pertinent ethnic groups of] ancestors
govern the applicability of the statute. Is it any trace of
[the pertinent ethnic] ancestry, or is it some unspecified
proportion of such ancestry that makes a person a
[member of the pertinent ethnic group]?7
For that matter, the very notion of discrete human “races” is, at best,
highly questionable. As the Supreme Court unanimously observed:

5

E.g., THE DAILY MULTIRACIAL, www.dailymulitracial.com (listing and providing
ethnic background information for prominent individuals of mixed ethnic heritage,
including: Queen Noor, Steve Jobs, Carol Channing, Bob Marley, Naomi Campbell,
Bruce Lee, Salma Hayek, Booker T. Washington, Lolo Jones, Alexandre Dumas,
Lani Guinier, Eddie Van Halen, Cher, Ben Kingsley, Jennifer Beals, Tiger Woods,
Halle Berry, Tim Howard, Carly Simon, Barack Obama, Lena Horne, and Anthony
Quinn); B L A C K F L I X . C O M , MULTIRACIAL CELEBRITIES, www.blackflix.com/articles
/multiracial.html (similar).
6
Multiracial in America, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 11, 2015), www.pewsocialtr
ends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/. (“Multiracial Americans are . . . growing at a
rate three times as fast as the population as a whole”).
7
Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 738, 198 P.2d 17, 28 (1948). See also Ozawa, 260
U.S. at 197 (“Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each individual
is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of the same race, even among
Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy
brunette, the latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or
yellow races”).
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There is a common popular understanding that there are
three major human races—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and
Negroid. Many modern biologists and anthropologists,
however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and
of little use in understanding the variability of human
beings. It is said that genetically homogeneous
populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous
between populations; therefore, a population can only be
described in terms of relative frequencies of various
traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize
races have been criticized as having little biological
significance. It has been found that differences between
individuals of the same race are often greater than the
differences between the “average” individuals of
different races. These observations and others have led
some, but not all, scientists to conclude that racial
classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather
than biological, in nature.8
As Judge Garza explained in the Fisher case, “The idea of dividing
people along racial lines is artificial and antiquated. Human beings are
not divisible biologically into any set number of races.”9
To be sure, individuals can take great pride in asserting their own
ethnic identities, whether Irish, African-American, Italian, Chinese, or
what have you. But it is an entirely different matter for the government to
attach consequences to such a label, whatever its source.
It is no answer for the government to have individuals self-designate
their race for purposes of government action.10 Even if the government
defers completely to an individual’s unfettered self-description, the
government is still conferring official significance upon a person’s status
as, e.g., “black” or “Semitic.”11 And if the government exercises any
8

St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987) (emphasis added)
(citing extensive authorities). See also Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 198 (“the conclusion that the
words ‘white person’ mean a Caucasian is not to establish a sharp line of demarcation
[ . . . ] but rather a zone of more or less debatable ground”).
9
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 264 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J.,
specially concurring) (footnote omitted).
10
UT currently asks applicants to “select the racial category or categories with which
you most closely identify.” Apply Texas, Sample Application, https://www.applytexas.or
g/adappc/html/preview16/frs_1.html. (offering five categories).
11
See also Nancy Leong, Multiracial Identity and Affirmative Action, 12 Asian Pac.
Am. L.J. 1, 24 (2007) [hereinafter “Leong”] (“Providing boxes to check compels
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supervision over the racial designations, it raises the sorry prospect of
state agents asserting, for example, that someone is “too white” to
qualify for minority status (or vice-versa). This is not an unrealistic
scenario, even in the modern world.12 Moreover, if the government
attaches real-world consequences to a racial label, that creates an
incentive for one to shade one’s self-description, if not outright lie.13

B.
The History of Government Racial Classification of
Individuals Is Not One that Should Be Imitated.
Governments have tried before to undertake the “sordid business” of
“divvying us up by race,”14 and the results have not been pretty.

1. Germany and Rwanda
The ugliest examples are associated with genocide. In Germany in
the early 20th Century, for example, the national regime composed
detailed formulae for determining who would or would not be deemed
Jewish. As Justice Stevens acidly observed, “If the National Government
is to make a serious effort to define racial classes by criteria that can be
administered objectively, it must study precedents such as the First
applicants to identify themselves in a certain way if they wish to benefit from affirmative
action and demands that they choose to associate themselves with other members of a
certain group . . . .[T]he race question forces applicants to declare their allegiance to an
underrepresented minority group, perhaps at the expense of other aspects of their racial
identity, if they wish to gain a certain benefit”).
12
E.g., Bob Pockrass, Pennsylvania driver sues NASCAR, claims he was excluded
from diversity program for being ‘too Caucasian’, PENN LIVE BLOG (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://blog.pennlive.com/pasports/2012/04/nascar_driver_too_caucasian.html (driver of
Puerto Rican and Spanish descent sues over exclusion from program for minorities);
Mem. in Support of Deft. Access Mktg & Commc’n LLC’s Mot. for Sum. Judg. at 12
n.7, Rodriguez v. NASCAR, No. 3:10-cv-00325 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2012) (“Plaintiff
did not fit the purpose of the affirmative action program because he looked like a
Caucasian male”). See also Michael Olesker, When ‘black’ apparently was not quite
black enough, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 3, 2002) (African-Lebanese plaintiff sues, alleging
failure to be hired for “diversity” position at college because he was “not visibly
black”).
13
E.g., J e s s e W a s h i n g t o n , Some Asians’ college strategy: Don’t check
‘Asian’, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 3, 2011); see also Leong, supra note 11, at 22
n.98 (“Anecdotal evidence supports the logical intuition that multiracial people
identify strategically on applications,” and an admissions consultant website expressly
advised applicants who are limited to checking one racial box to “‘check the box that
indicates the most disadvantaged group’”); cf. Mark Hanrahan, Rachel Dolezal,
Spokane NAACP President, Falsely Claimed To Be Black, Family Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(June 12, 2015).
14
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, J., joined by Alito, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935 . . . .”15
The horrific steps following this categorization led to the deaths of
millions of Jews. In Rwanda, racial labeling immensely facilitated the
genocidal massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in 1994.
Mandatory government identification cards listed bearers as belonging to
supposedly distinct tribal groups, most notably either Hutu or Tutsi.
“[T]he designation ‘Tutsi’ spelled a death sentence at any roadblock.”16

2. United States
The United States has had its own unhappy experiments with
government conferral of significance upon racial labels. In particular,
enforcement of racial segregation, miscegenation, and immigration laws
required the government to attach legal significance to the question what
racial “box” a person belonged to.
In Morgan v. Virginia, this Court observed: “In states where
separation of races is required . . . , a method of identification as white or
colored must be employed.”17 Lower courts consequently had to wrestle
with the ultimately arbitrary question, “Who exactly is white and who is
nonwhite?”18
The case of Wall v. Oyster, is illustrative.19 The Wall case involved
the use of racial labels to determine admission to educational institutions.
In the District of Columbia, the government maintained separate schools
for “white” and “colored” children.20 A child named Isabel Wall began
attending the “white” school, but the principal excluded her “shortly
thereafter . . . on the ground that she was a ‘colored child,’” despite the
fact that Isabel asserted “she is a white child in personal appearance, and
is so treated and recognized by her neighbors and friends.” The trial
court acknowledged that “‘[T]here was to be observed of the child no
physical characteristic which afforded ocular evidence suggestive of
aught but the Caucasian,’” but ruled that because “‘the child is of negro
15

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
German law defining Jews by ancestry or by combination of ancestry and marriage or
religious practice).
16
Jim Fussell, Group Classification of National ID Cards as a Factor in Genocide and
Ethnic Cleansing, Presentation to the Seminar Series of the Yale University Genocide
Studies Program (Nov. 15, 2001), www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/removing-facilitatin
g-factors/IDcards/.
17
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 382, 383, n.28 (1946) (listing as examples tests
for “any ascertainable Negro blood” and “one-fourth or more Negro blood”).
18
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
19
Wall v. Oyster, 36 App. D.C. 50 (1910).
20
Id. at 53.
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blood of one eighth to one sixteenth . . . her racial status is that of the
negro [and s]he is, therefore, “colored,” according to the common
meaning of the term . . . .’”21
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed. That court observed that “the
duty was necessarily devolved . . . upon the board of education to
determine what children are white and what are colored whenever that
question shall arise in a particular case.”22 The court noted the variety of
approaches taken by the states: “In some States ‘colored persons’ are
declared by the statute to be those having a certain proportion of negro
blood in their veins,—in some instances one fourth; in some one eighth;
in some one sixteenth; and in others any admixture.”23 Since Congress
had provided no such mathematical definition, the appeals court believed
itself “compelled to ascertain the popular meaning of the word
‘colored.’”24 After reviewing the approach taken in several cases and
consulting the dictionary, the court concluded that “the word ‘colored,’
as applied to persons or races, is commonly understood to mean persons
wholly or in part of negro blood, or having any appreciable admixture
thereof.”25
The Wall court’s struggle with the delineation of racial categories
was by no means unique. Other courts undertook similar challenges.26
These official excursions into racial classification rightly strike the
21

Id. at 50-52.
Id. at 54.
23
Id. at 56.
24
Id. at 57.
25
Id. at 58.
26
E.g., Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 178 (holding a Japanese immigrant is not a “white person”);
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding a “high caste Hindu
of full Indian blood” is not a “white person”); State ex rel. Farmer v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs, 145 So. 575 (Ala. 1933) (upholding exclusion of creole children from “white”
school and their relegation to “colored” school, and discussing similar precedents and
policy of racial separation); Weaver v. State, 116 So. 893, 895 (Ala. Ct. App. 1928)
(miscegenation prosecution) (“It was proper to prove that defendant’s grandfather had
‘kinky hair.’ This is one of the determining characteristics of the negro. This also applies
to the questions involving the nose and other features. It is proper in a case of this kind to
prove the race of defendant by description of any or all the characteristics belonging to
the negro race, and even a photograph has been held to be admissible”); State v. Sch.
Dist. No. 16, 242 S.W. 545, 545 (Ark. 1922) (“it cannot be said there was no substantial
evidence tending to show a trace of negro blood in the veins of said children”); State v.
Treadway, 52 So. 500 (La. 1910) (miscegenation prosecution) (extensive treatment of
distinction between “Negro” and “colored” to determine that an “octoroon” was not a
“Negro”); Messina v. Ciaccio, 290 So. 2d 339 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (birth certificate
designation of race) (discussion of imprecision of various racial terms). Cf. McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 187, 198 n.6 (1964) (“At the trial one of the arresting officers
was permitted, over objection, to state his conclusion as to the race of each appellant
based on his observation of their physical appearance”).
22
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modern mind as appallingly racist and insensitive to the fundamental
humanity of all persons, regardless of skin color, features, or ancestry.
“The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings
or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of
the land are involved.”27
In the Fisher case, the University of Texas, a governmental entity,
gives significance—and thus potentially dispositive significance—to a
prospective student’s racial label.28 Indeed, the applicant’s race appears
on the front page of the application.29 “[I]t is undisputed that race is a
meaningful factor” in the admissions process.30 That the university
professes a benign motive for this exercise does not change the fact that
“the very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary’s qualifying
racial characteristics is repugnant to our constitutional ideals.”31 “The
worst forms of racial discrimination in this Nation have always been
accompanied by straight-faced representations that discrimination helped
minorities.”32 Regardless of whether the government itself makes the
racial labeling determination or puts upon the individual the task of selflabeling (with or without any government oversight to forestall
manipulation of the system, see supra), it is the government that
ultimately says the label matters. That is inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.
“The time cannot come too soon when no governmental decision
will be based upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation or
origin.”33 Colleges and universities ought not to impose racial
classifications upon applicants or students, or require such applicants or
students to self-categorize. To do so, no matter how sincerely and
benignly intentioned, is ultimately incoherent, associates the institution
with some of the most repellant practices of history, and runs afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

27

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Ishop Dep. Tr.at 19, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, No. 1:08-cv-00263SS (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2008).
29
Id. at 19; see A P P L Y T E X A S , Sample Application Form, https://www.apply
texas.org/adappc/html/preview16/frs_1.html.
30
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
31
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 534 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring).
33
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring).
28

